P.I. Lawyer Calls Foul Ball on Baseball Act
Chicago Lawyer, 04/01/1993By Robert A. Clifford
4/1/1993 - Chicago Lawyer
The first "foul ball" law in the country took effect this year in Illinois. With baseball season upon us, the Baseball Facility Liability Act (740 ILCS 38 (1993)) is now up to bat.
The new law means fans unintentionally struck by a foul ball or errant bat at Wrigley Field, Comiskey Park or any other privately or publicly owned ballpark in Illinois cannot file a lawsuit for damages.
The Cubs and White Sox organizations sought the legislation as a result of recent court decisions that left the owners and operators of ballparks open to lawsuits.
Two cases in particular prompted this legislation. The Illinois Appellate Court upheld a $67,500 damage award against the Cubs in the case of a 10-year-old boy who was struck in the face by a ball off the bat of Leon Durham in 1983.
In Yates v. Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc., 230 Ill. App. 3d 472, 595 N.E. 2d 570 (1st Dist. 1992), the ticket-paying child was sitting behind home plate when the foul ball struck him in the face. The child required surgery and remained in the hospital for five days. He suffered severe headaches and double vision at times as a result of the injury.
The new law will not affect that case; but in subsequent cases it means if a patron is injured or killed, as was the case of a boy in Dodger Stadium in 1970, as a result of negligence on the part of a baseball player, coach, manager, owner or operator, then that injured person has to foot all the medical bills.
A separate case involved the Chicago White Sox, Colonel v. Chicago White Sox, ltd., 230 Ill. App. 3d 734, 595 N.E. 2d 45 (1st Dist. 1992). A woman was sitting behind home plate a few seats away from a protective screen. She looked down to her lap to pick up some popcorn and was struck on the right side of her face by a line-drive, foul-tipped ball. She suffered a broken jaw. The trial court dismissed the case on the pleadings.
On appeal the court held that whether the warnings to plaintiff were adequate was a question of fact for the jury. Summary judgment, therefore, was denied.
The defendant contended that a warning was flashed on the large screen and an announcement was made over the public address system of the possible dangers. Additionally, the defendant contended a small caveat was printed on the ticket stub which had been collected from the plaintiff when she entered the ballpark.
But the court found that the common law in Illinois holds that landowners cannot disclaim a duty of reasonable care to those rightfully on their premises merely because the danger is "open and obvious." Under the new law, though, that duty has been abrogated.
Strike One against the new law is that it essentially replaces the doctrines of reasonable care and comparative negligence with the doctrine of assumption of risk.
A fan now cannot sue if he is unintentionally hit. Only when a spectator is sitting behind a defective protective screen or when he is a victim of "reckless behavior" caused by an employee of the ballpark owner or operator is a lawsuit allowed under this law. But this burden of proof is nearly impossible for plaintiff to prove.
Strike Two is the notion that this legislation makes the determination of no liability as a matter of law, regardless of the circumstances, stealing the question of fact from the jury. Although the number of cases impacted by this special legislation is quite limited, the objection is directed at "special niche" legislation in general. In other words, who really benefits here? No one is questioning the importance of the Cubs, the White Sox or other sports teams to the state and the city. Baseball has long occupied an endearing part of our nation's culture as the "national pastime."
Strike Three is the special status endowed on this group of defendants in the tort community. The mischief caused by such sweeping and unnecessary tort reform can have potentially greater consequences.
Furthermore, the need for this legislation and the danger that it causes to the ticket-buying public should be questioned. Before the legislation was passed, fastening liability on baseball clubs for extraordinary hazards generally was unsuccessful. The owners of the sports teams, already enjoying limited duties, simply did not need this protection. In those few instances where people are seriously injured, the owners do not deserve such protection.
It must be remembered that the tort system is funded by insurance premiums. Therefore, the real benefactors of this law are the owners who will pay lower liability insurance premiums. These dollar savings can translate to higher salaries or bonuses for the ballplayers or owners, with no accountability for their negligence.
Is a potential reduction in insurance premiums a legitimate reason for interfering with the tort system? When it is the victims paying the price, it's more than just peanuts and Cracker Jack.
The new law means fans unintentionally struck by a foul ball or errant bat at Wrigley Field, Comiskey Park or any other privately or publicly owned ballpark in Illinois cannot file a lawsuit for damages.
The Cubs and White Sox organizations sought the legislation as a result of recent court decisions that left the owners and operators of ballparks open to lawsuits.
Two cases in particular prompted this legislation. The Illinois Appellate Court upheld a $67,500 damage award against the Cubs in the case of a 10-year-old boy who was struck in the face by a ball off the bat of Leon Durham in 1983.
In Yates v. Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc., 230 Ill. App. 3d 472, 595 N.E. 2d 570 (1st Dist. 1992), the ticket-paying child was sitting behind home plate when the foul ball struck him in the face. The child required surgery and remained in the hospital for five days. He suffered severe headaches and double vision at times as a result of the injury.
The new law will not affect that case; but in subsequent cases it means if a patron is injured or killed, as was the case of a boy in Dodger Stadium in 1970, as a result of negligence on the part of a baseball player, coach, manager, owner or operator, then that injured person has to foot all the medical bills.
A separate case involved the Chicago White Sox, Colonel v. Chicago White Sox, ltd., 230 Ill. App. 3d 734, 595 N.E. 2d 45 (1st Dist. 1992). A woman was sitting behind home plate a few seats away from a protective screen. She looked down to her lap to pick up some popcorn and was struck on the right side of her face by a line-drive, foul-tipped ball. She suffered a broken jaw. The trial court dismissed the case on the pleadings.
On appeal the court held that whether the warnings to plaintiff were adequate was a question of fact for the jury. Summary judgment, therefore, was denied.
The defendant contended that a warning was flashed on the large screen and an announcement was made over the public address system of the possible dangers. Additionally, the defendant contended a small caveat was printed on the ticket stub which had been collected from the plaintiff when she entered the ballpark.
But the court found that the common law in Illinois holds that landowners cannot disclaim a duty of reasonable care to those rightfully on their premises merely because the danger is "open and obvious." Under the new law, though, that duty has been abrogated.
Strike One against the new law is that it essentially replaces the doctrines of reasonable care and comparative negligence with the doctrine of assumption of risk.
A fan now cannot sue if he is unintentionally hit. Only when a spectator is sitting behind a defective protective screen or when he is a victim of "reckless behavior" caused by an employee of the ballpark owner or operator is a lawsuit allowed under this law. But this burden of proof is nearly impossible for plaintiff to prove.
Strike Two is the notion that this legislation makes the determination of no liability as a matter of law, regardless of the circumstances, stealing the question of fact from the jury. Although the number of cases impacted by this special legislation is quite limited, the objection is directed at "special niche" legislation in general. In other words, who really benefits here? No one is questioning the importance of the Cubs, the White Sox or other sports teams to the state and the city. Baseball has long occupied an endearing part of our nation's culture as the "national pastime."
Strike Three is the special status endowed on this group of defendants in the tort community. The mischief caused by such sweeping and unnecessary tort reform can have potentially greater consequences.
Furthermore, the need for this legislation and the danger that it causes to the ticket-buying public should be questioned. Before the legislation was passed, fastening liability on baseball clubs for extraordinary hazards generally was unsuccessful. The owners of the sports teams, already enjoying limited duties, simply did not need this protection. In those few instances where people are seriously injured, the owners do not deserve such protection.
It must be remembered that the tort system is funded by insurance premiums. Therefore, the real benefactors of this law are the owners who will pay lower liability insurance premiums. These dollar savings can translate to higher salaries or bonuses for the ballplayers or owners, with no accountability for their negligence.
Is a potential reduction in insurance premiums a legitimate reason for interfering with the tort system? When it is the victims paying the price, it's more than just peanuts and Cracker Jack.
