In the last veto session of his term as governor, Edgar was meeting in closed-door sessions with legislative leaders, quietly pushing to make it more difficult for laws to be struck down once they have been on the books for six months.

Apparently, he wanted to put limits on legal challenges of laws where legislators had combined separate, unrelated subjects - albeit deemed unrelated by whom - by putting an arbitrary six-month time clock on any court challenge. In other words, any constitutional challenge to a law must be mounted within six months after a bill becomes law.

In his preemptive strike, Edgar seems to deliberately ignore the fact that it may take months, if not years, for an infringement of the law to occur. How does one put a statute of limitations on a constitutional violation, anyway?

But an even greater concern is the governor’s taking away the very power of judicial review clearly vested in the courts.

Just look at some of the constitutional issues considered by the Illinois Supreme Court in the last year:

• provisions allowing tax objections to be addressed directly in circuit court were found not to violate the separation of powers provision of the State Constitution (People v. Devine, 18 Ill.2d 522, 693 N.E.2d 349 (decided March 19, 1998));

• provisions of the Toll Highway Act allowing money received by the Tollway Highway Authority to be held in special funds and disbursed on order of the Authority were found not to violate the State Constitution (Graham v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 182 Ill.2d 287, 695 N.E.2d 360 (decided March 19, 1998));

• defendant who was taken by police officers from courtroom for interrogation on separate charges did not have his rights to due process and assistance of counsel violated under the State Constitution (People v. Johnson, 182 Ill.2d 96, 695 N.E.2d 435 (decided April 16, 1998));

• provision in statute criminalizing home repair fraud, which created rebuttable presumption that contractor did not intend to perform contract, violated due process rights of defendant by shifting the burden of proof away from the State (People v. Watts, 181 Ill.2d 133, 692 N.E.2d 315 (decided Feb. 20, 1998));

• provisions of Juvenile Court Act that prevent minors 13 years of age or older who have been charged with criminal offense or adjudicated delinquent from being placed in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services did not violate equal protection clause (In re A.A., a Minor v. The People of the State of Illinois, 181 Ill.2d 32, 690 N.E.2d 980 (decided Jan. 23, 1998)).

I should also include in this list the significant case, Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997), which found the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court there considered a series of issues that were combined into a single law, radically changing the practice of tort law in the state.

It is unclear if Edgar’s measure would require approval only by the General Assembly or whether it would require a constitutional amendment. But what is clear is that the consideration of some of these cases would be banned under Edgar’s hourglass approach to justice.

Edgar’s justification? He wanted to see adoption of a measure that could stem the "tide" of laws being struck down months or years after being on the books. But after a meeting with legislative leaders in November, Edgar announced that the idea did not have sufficient support to move forward, although he noted to the press that the issue will still be around after he leaves offices in January.

It’s clear that Edgar is using his last days in office to try to take care of a "pet peeve." In his last eight years in office, at least a dozen bills he signed into law have been overturned on constitutional grounds by the Illinois Supreme Court. He obviously was trying to get his last "dig" into the judicial system, which has been at odds with his office throughout his tenure.

But to use the veto session for this purpose is just not right. Typically, veto sessions are meant for dealing with the governor’s vetoes during the last session or any major emergency issues such as budget shortfalls. Veto sessions should not be used to try to introduce brand new issues by a lame-duck governor when the General Assembly is trying to wrestle with a number of concerns in an abbreviated session.

Nor is it the governor’s job to tell the judiciary what to do or how to do it. The judiciary is elected in this state to interpret the constitution. It is the governor’s job to uphold it.

With all of the concerns of the state legislature - from education, to gambling, to the death penalty, to gasoline taxes - it is unnecessary for the governor or the legislature to concern itself with "fixing" a wheel that’s just not broken.