Recent Guidance of Self-Imposed Rules

During discovery, it is common to request a party’s internal rules, guidelines, and regulations to determine whether the party acted in violation of “its own rules.”  This “custom-like” evidence has been found to be relevant to “establishing the proper standard of care to be exercised by the defendant,” “what was feasible,” and “what the defendant knew or should have known.”  See Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326, 332 (1965) (“in the present case the regulations, standards, and bylaws which the plaintiff introduced into evidence, performed much the same function as did evidence of custom.  This evidence aided the jury in deciding what was feasible and what the defendant knew or should have known”); Spence v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 34 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1068 (1975) (“Rules or regulations adopted by defendant, as evidence, serve a useful function in establishing the proper standard of care to be exercised by the defendant”).

Several courts have stated recently, however, that “[v]iolations of ‘self-imposed rules or internal guidelines’ do not normally impose a legal duty, let alone constitute evidence of negligence or beyond that, willful and wanton conduct.’”  See e.g. Williams v. City of Evanston, 378 Ill.App.3d 590, 601, (2007); Shuttlesworth v. City of Chicago, 377 Ill.App.3d 360, 368 (2007); Wade v. City of Chicago, 364 Ill.App.3d 773, 781082 (2006); Morton v. City of Chicago, 286 Ill.App.3d 444,454 (1997).  Based upon that statement, the argument could be made that violations of internal rules are completely irrelevant to issues of duty, negligence, and (if a municipality is involved) willful and wanton conduct.  The question becomes to what extent are violations of such rules relevant.

Last year, the 1st District Appellate Court shed light on that issue in Hudson v. City of Chicago, 378 Ill.App.3d 373, 881 N.E.2d 430 (2007).

In Hudson, the plaintiff alleged that city police officers acted willfully and wantonly during a high-speed chase on the Eisenhower Expressway.  To support that argument, the Plaintiff relied upon violations of the police department’s general order relating to high-speed pursuits.

During trial, portions of the general order that the plaintiff alleged had been violated were read by police officers involved in the chase and at the close of the evidence those general order violations were contained in the jury instruction listing the plaintiff’s allegations of willful and wanton conduct against the city.

On appeal, the city argued that it was error for the court to have included the violations of the general order in the issue instruction because “it suggested that violation of police department general order constituted willful and wanton conduct per se.”

Though it agreed that “countermanding a police department general order does not constitute negligence or willful and wanton conduct per se,” the 1st District rejected the argument that such violations are irrelevant to the issue of whether the police department acted willfully and wantonly, citing Morton.

The Hudson court said, a violation of the general order could not “in and of itself” constitute willful and wanton conduct because the jury could find that there was a “valid reason” for not complying with that order.

Analyzing its prior decision in Morton, however, the court found that while such evidence “alone” could not qualify as willful and wanton conduct, “a violation of an internal police department rule can constitute some evidence of willful and wanton conduct” and the “jury may consider it along with other evidence in reaching a determination of willful and wanton conduct.”

It would appear that self-imposed internal rules and violations of those rules are relevant but not conclusive to determining inter ala, the appropriate standard of care and whether a party acted negligently or willfully and wantonly.  In other words, while a violation of an internal rule does not have the same legal effect as a violation of a statute or ordinance “designed to protect human life,” i.e., constituting prima facie evidence of negligence and requiring a defendant to prove that he acted reasonably under the circumstances despite that violation (see Price ex rel. Massey v. Hickory Point Bank & Trust, No. 0192, 362 Ill.App.3d 1211, 1216 (2006), citing Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 144 Ill.2d 425, 434 (1991)), a jury may consider it in deciding the proper standard of care and whether a party’s conduct was negligent or willful and wanton, according to Hudson; see also Spence, citing Darling.

The confusion stems from the broad statement in Wade, Shuttlesworth, and Williams that a “violation of self-imposed rules or internal guidelines does not normally impose a legal duty, let alone constitute evidence of negligence or beyond that, willful and wanton conduct.”

Those courts relied upon Morton for that statement, which, in turn, relied upon Blankenship, 269 Ill.App.3d at 422-23.  The issue in Blankenship, however, was whether “a duty arises from the Park District’s internal rules which required at least one lifeguard to remain on duty during the adult swim period.”

The Blankenship court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that a duty existed based upon that internal rule, noting that “[w]hile the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect human life or property is prima facie evidence of negligence [citations omitted], a legal duty is normally not established through rules or internal guidelines.”  The court did not find that violations of “self-imposed rules or internal guidelines” are completely irrelevant to issues of the appropriate standard of care and whether a party acted negligently or willfully and wantonly.

Thus, while violations of internal rules or guidelines may not have the same legal effect as a violation of al statute or ordinance, it appears that those violations can constitute some evidence of negligence or willful and wanton conduct.